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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted
tort issues of varying magnitude and significance. The court's
analyses ranged from logical discussions of comparative negligence
to a treatment of the controversial wrongful life cause of action.
The supreme court, as well as several appellate district courts, focused upon issues that defined causes of action and determined
whether an action would survive. The courts analyzed also the
duty of landowners, motor-vehicle operators, employers, reporters,
and publishers. The courts also considered questions about proximate cause and the extent of damages for which a party may be
liable, and interpretations of the Contribution Act and the Structural Work Act. In short, the focus was often upon defining the
scope and breadth of a defendant's responsibility.
II.
A.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

The Wrongful Life Cause of Action

In Goldberg v. Ruskin,' the Illinois Supreme Court considered
for the first time, and rejected, a cause of action for wrongful life.2
Jeffrey Goldberg was born with Tay-Sachs disease, an incurable,
fatal hereditary disorder. 3 Jeffrey's parents brought suit on his be1. 113 Ill. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986).
2. Id. at 482-92, 499 N.E.2d at 406-10. The wrongful life cause of action is brought
by a child whose parents would have aborted the child if they had been given the information they desired or if tests had determined the child's diseased condition. The alleged
injury is being born. Id. at 484, 486-87, 499 N.E.2d at 407-08. See also Siemieniec v.
Lutheran General Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987) (a case decided outside
the Survey year which included a more detailed discussion by the Illinois Supreme Court
of the wrongful life cause of action).
3. Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 483, 499 N.E.2d at 406. The appellate court described the
disease as follows:
Tay-Sachs disease is a fatal, progressive, degenerative disease of the nervous
system which occurs primarily in Jewish infants of eastern European ancestry.
A diseased child appears normal at birth, but at four to six months of age, the
child's central nervous system begins to degenerate, and he suffers eventual
blindness, deafness, paralysis, seizures, and mental retardation. His life expectancy is two to four years. Only in the circumstances where both parents are
carriers of the Tay-Sachs trait will there be a great likelihood of the presence of
the disease in their offspring. The carrier is not affected by the disease, but if
both parents are carriers, the probability that their child will have the disease is
one in four. There is a blood test to identify carriers of the Tay-Sachs trait. If
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half' against the treating obstetrician-gynecologist and his employer, a hospital.- The plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Ruskin's failure
to perform any tests to detect Tay-Sachs disease or to inform the
parents about the possibility of the disease occurring deprived
them of vital information. They contended that, had they been
provided this information, they would have chosen to abort the
fetus, and Jeffrey would not have been born.6 The plaintiffs also
contended that Jeffrey should receive damages for the pain and suffering he endured during his lifetime.7
The court admitted that the plaintiffs' allegations contained the
components necessary to state a cause of action for wrongful life,
provided that the wrongful life cause of action was a recognized

claim.8 The court, however, refused to recognize the tort of

tests show that both parents are carriers, a further test known as amniocentesis
can be performed to determine whether the fetus is afflicted with the disease.
Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1031 n.2, 471 N.E.2d 530, 532, n.2 (1st Dist.
1984).
4. Goldberg, 113 I1. 2d at 483, 499 N.E.2d at 406. Jeffrey died while the first appeal
was pending. The appellate court appointed his father as special administrator of his
estate in order to prosecute the action. 128 Ill. App. 3d at 1030 n.l, 471 N.E.2d at 531
n. 1.
5. Goldberg, 113 Il. 2d at 483, 499 N.E.2d at 406. The Goldbergs also brought a
claim on their own behalf seeking recovery for medical expenses they incurred in treating
Jeffrey's illness. Id. at 484, 499 N.E.2d at 406-07. Such claims are known as "wrongful
birth" causes of action.
"Wrongful Birth" refers to the claims for relief of parents who allege they
would have avoided conception or terminated the pregnancy by abortion but for
the negligence of those charged with prenatal testing, genetic prognosticating,
or counseling parents as to the likelihood of giving birth to a physically or mentally impaired child. The underlying premise is that prudent medical care
would have detected the risk of a congenital or hereditary genetic disorder
either prior to conception or during pregnancy. As a proximate result of this
negligently performed or omitted genetic counseling or prenatal testing, the parents were foreclosed from making an informed decision whether to conceive a
potentially handicapped child or, in the event of a pregnancy, to terminate the
same.
Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 235, 512 N.E.2d 691, 695. See
Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 14
FAM. L.Q. 15, 16-17 (1980); Comment, Damages for Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Pregnancy in Illinois, 15 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 799, 799-800 (1984); Comment, Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth Causes of Action-Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L.
REV. 611, 621-23 (1980); Comment, "Wrongful Life" The Right Not to be Born, 54 TUL.
L. REV. 480, 424-85 (1980). See generally 1 DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 14.06
(1982). The paren.Is' wrongful birth claim was not at issue in Goldberg. 113 11. 2d at
484, 499 N.E.2d at 406-07. But see Siemieniec, 117 II12d at 253-60, 512 N.E.2d at 70307, which discussed the issue of wrongful birth.
6. Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 483-84, 499 N.E.2d at 406.
7. Id. at 484, 499 N.E.2d at 406.
8. Id. at 484-85, 499 N.E.2d at 407. The court stated:
In general, in an action for wrongful life a child who has been born with a
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wrongful life.9
In analyzing the plaintiffs' claim, the court first distinguished the
wrongful life cause of action from the right to be born whole.' 0 In

cases involving the right to be born whole, the alleged causal link
between the tortfeasor's conduct and the injury is clear: the plaintiff asserts that if not for the negligent act, the child would have
been born healthy. I The court emphasized that Jeffrey Goldberg
never had a chance to be born healthy.' 2 The complaint did not
allege that it was Dr. Ruskin's conduct that caused the disease to

occur. 3 Instead, the right allegedly violated in this case was Jef-

frey's "right not to be born."' 4 Following the lead of the majority
of courts in the United States,' 5 the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to recognize a cause of action grounded in the right not to be
born.16 The court stated, "[u]ltimately, the infant's complaint is
that he would be better off not to have been born. Man, who
knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot possibly know
whether that is so."' 7
disease or other disorder asserts that he would not have been born had the
physician or other health care professional in question informed his parents that
the particular ailment might occur. Also necessary to the action is, of course,
the assertion that the parents would not have conceived the child or would have
aborted the pregnancy if they had been given the information.

Id.
9. Id. at 491-92, 499 N.E.2d at 410.
10. Id. at 486-87, 499 N.E.2d at 408. The right to be born whole was envisioned first
by the court in T enslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). See
also Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I11.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Amann v.
Faidy, 415 11. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
11. Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 487, 499 N.E.2d at 408.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 485-86, 499 N.E.2d at 407. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala.
1978); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982);
Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 122 Mich. App. 116, 332
N.W.2d 432 (1982); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986); Procanik v. Cillo.
97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483
(1983); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.- 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). But see
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980)
(general damages awarded to child for wrongful life claim).
16. Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 491-92, 499 N.E.2d at 410.
17. Id. at 489, 499 N.E.2a at 409 (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227
A.2d 689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). But
see Justice Clark's dissent from the Goldbergdecision in which he scolds the majority for
acting as philosophers rather than judges:
What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that a judgment against liabil-
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The court added that the comparison-defying nature of the
wrongful life claim leads to practical as well as conceptual
problems. 8 The court noted in particular the difficulty of determining damages, which necessitates comparing a child's injured
state with the condition he would have been in had the injury never
happened, when the latter would place the child outside the realm
of existence. 19 The court concluded, "the difficulties in evaluating
the harm and measuring
the damage are insurmountable barriers
20
to recovery here.

Prior to the Goldberg decision, it was uncertain whether Illinois
would allow a diseased or deformed child to maintain a cause of
action for having been born and thereby being subjected to the pain
and suffering that accompanies the child's disease. After Goldberg,
it is clear that in Illinois, such a child, no matter how severely
debilitated, may not recover damages absent a clearer link between
the physician's acts or omissions and the diseases or deformities of
the child.
B.

Wrongful Pregnancy

In Clay v. Brodsky, 2 1the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District discussed what a plaintiff must show to present a prima
facie case in wrongful pregnancy 22 under the res ipsa loquitur docity also enters the "shadow world" of comparison between life and non-life. By
its decision today, the court implicitly decides that Jeffrey Goldberg was better
off enduring a life of pain, blindness, deafness, paralysis, seizures, and mental
retardation, inevitably ending in early death, than not living at all. The court is
no more or less competent to render that judgment than to render any other.
Goldberg, 113 111. 2d at 493, 499 N.E.2d at 411 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). In his view, the
Goldberg complaint made out a "classical case of negligence." Id. at 493, 499 N.E.2d at
410. Moreover, Justice Clark noted that more and more opinions and commentators
advocated recognizing the wrongful life cause of action. Id. at 495, 499 N.E.2d at 412.
See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980); Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1409 (1977). See also Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
18. Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 489, 499 N.E.2d at 409.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 490, 499 N.E.2d at 410. In his dissent, Chief Justice Clark suggested that
damages could be determined by weighing "the burdens attributable to the child's birth
with congenital defects against the benefits the child can derive from life despite the defects." Id. at 496, 499 N.E.2d at 412 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). See Rogers, Wrongful Life
and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33
S.C.L. REV. 713, 738 (1982).
21. 148 Il. App. 3d 63, 499 N.E.2d 68 (4th Dist. 1986).
22. The wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception cause of action developed before
the wrongful life and wrongful birth causes of action. Wrongful pregnancy fits only a
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trine. 23 The court indicated that the usual elements of the doctrine
applied. 24 These elements are: (1) that the occurrence which
caused the plaintiff's injury does not ordinarily happen without
negligence; (2) that the agency or instrumentality involved was exclusively within the control of the defendant; and (3) that the
plaintiff was free of contributory negligence. 25 Regarding the first
element, the plaintiff presented uncontroverted evidence that the
defendant performed a sterilization procedure on the plaintiff, and
within a few weeks, the plaintiff became pregnant.26 Also, the
plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that normally, pregnancy does
not occur within such a short time after a sterilization operation
absent negligence, that the type of operation used by the defendant
is highly effective when properly done, and that the bands used in
the procedure did not appear defective. The court held
this evi28
dence sufficient to establish the first element of proof.
The court deemed the second element satisfied by the testimony
of expert witnesses that the plaintiff's injury resulted from a procedure exclusively within Dr. Brodsky's control. One witness testified that the usual cause of an ineffective banding procedure was a
physician's error in placing the band on tissue other than the fallopian tube. In addition, the testimony of the plaintiff's treating obnarrow fact pattern. "Liability is based either on the physician's negligence in performing a sterilization procedure or an abortion or the pharmacist's or pharmaceutical manufacturer's negligence in preparing or dispensing a contraceptive prescription. The essence
of the wrong for which compensation is sought in some cases is the birth of a healthy and
normal-albeit, unplanned and unwanted-child." Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d 230, 237, 512
N.E.2d 691, 696 (1987). See W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, TORTS § 55, at 372-73 (5th ed.
1984); Hampton, The Continuing Debate Over the Recoverability of the Costs of ChildRearing in "Wrongful Conception" Cases: Searching for Appropriate Judicial Guidelines,
20 FAM. L.Q. 45, 47-48 (1986); Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S.C. L. REV. 759, 763-92
(1982); Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1409, 1410-19 (1977); Robertson, Civil Liability Arising From "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 132-35 (1978); See
generally Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83
A.L.R.3d 15 (1978).
23. Clay, 148 Il1. App. 3d at 65-77, 499 N.E.2d at 70-74. The literal meaning of res
ipsa loquitur is "the thing speaks for itself." Imig v. Beck, 115 Ill. 2d 18, 25, 503 N.E.2d
324, 328 (1986). The doctrine usually comes into play when the defendant possesses the
knowledge or is in control of any direct evidence that may exist concerning the cause of
the plaintiff's injury. Clay, 14$ Ill. App. 3d at 70, 499 N.E.2d at 73. The doctrine allows
the trier of fact to infer negligence from the plaintiff's presentation of circumstantial
evidence. The inference is rebuttable. Id. at 72, 499 N.E.2d at 74.
24. Clay, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 70, 499 N.E.2d at 73.
25. Id. This last element was eliminated subsequently in Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill.
2d 232, 500 N.E.2d 8 (1986). See infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
26. Clay, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 66, 499 N.E.2d at 70.
27. Id. at 68-71, 499 N.E.2d at 71-73.
28. Id. at 71, 499 N.E.2d at 73.
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stetrician indicated this error had in fact occurred. He testified
that he found one band attached to tissue other than a fallopian
29
tube and one floating freely.
Finally, the court found that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of the third element of res ipsa loquitur; the evidence supported the conclusion that she was free of contributory negligence.
Expert testimony established that the plaintiff could not have contributed to her own fertility.30 The court observed that if the sterilization procedure had been performed properly, nothing the
plaintiff could have done would have undone the banding of the
fallopian tubes. 3 ' The court awarded the plaintiff damages for loss
of income, pain, and physical problems related to the birth.32 The
court cautioned, however, that parents bringing actions for wrongful pregnancy cannot recover damages for the costs incurred in
rearing a normal, healthy child.33
Thus, the court in Clay clarified the areas of proof that a plaintiff
must present to maintain successfully a wrongful pregnancy action
under a theory of res ipsa loquitur. The Clay decision, however,
acts as a double-edged sword. The decision also favors plaintiffs by
reinforcing the availability of the wrongful pregnancy cause of actions for a plaintiff who undergoes sterilization surgery and then
becomes pregnant. The decision also favors, however, defendants
who perform sterilization procedures negligently because it places
a cap on available damages and limits a negligent physician's responsibility to the expenses and pain directly relating to the pregnancy itself and the resulting childbirth.
C. Hospital Liabilityfor Physicians. Agency
During the Survey year, two different appellate districts decided
two factually similar cases, the outcomes of which hinged upon the
same agency issue.3 4 The two courts' nearly-opposite treatment of
the issue evinced a sharp conflict of opinion between the districts.
In Greene v. Rogers,35 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District briefly considered basing liability on apparent agency, but
29. Id. at 68, 71, 499 N.E.2d at 71, 74.
30. Id. at 71, 499 N.E.2d at 74.
31. Id. at 69, 499 N.E.2d at 73-74.
32. Id. at 76-77, 499 N.E.2d at 76-78.
33. Id. at 76, 499 N.E.2d at 77. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 I1. 2d 193, 201,
447 N.E.2d 385, 389 (1983).
34. See Greene v. Rogers, 147 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 498 N.E.2d 867 (3d Dist. 1986) and
Sztorc v. Northwest Hosp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 275, 496 N.E.2d 1200 (1st Dist. 1986).
35. 147 Il. App. 3d 1009, 498 N.E.2d 867.
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declined to break from tradition. Consequently, the court followed
the precedential majority in recognizing as valid only an actual
agency theory of recovery in tort.36
The plaintiff in Greene attempted to hold a hospital liable for the
acts of an emergency-room physician under the doctrine of respondeat superior.37 The court stated that it would hold the hospital
liable only if the physician was actually the hospital's agent.38 Because a treating physician usually has discretion in treating his patients, hospitals generally cannot be held liable for the negligence
of the treating physician.39 In deciding whether an express agency
relationship existed between the parties, the court looked mainly to
whether the hospital retained control over the emergency-room
physician's actions and to how the physician was paid/ ° The court
noted that although the hospital maintained some control over a
patient, that control was merely administrative. This administrative role did not include control over how a physician would treat a
patient, and thus did not denote an agency relationship between
the hospital and the physician.
The court next addressed the payment issue. The physician in
question was a member of a medical services group. The hospital
paid the group a flat rate per month. It did not pay according to
actual services rendered.4 2 The court stated that this indirect
method of payment indicated that no express agency relationship
existed. 3
The court then considered and rejected liability based on the theory of apparent agency." The court noted that apparent agency
generally was considered to be a contract theory of recovery rather
than a tort theory of recovery.4 5 The court noted that although
some state courts allow recovery in medical malpractice cases
under a tort theory of apparent agency, no Illinois court had yet to
36. Id. at 1016, 498 N.E.2d at 872.
37. Id. at 1014, 498 N.E.2d at 870. The doctrine of respondeat superior, literally
meaning "look to the man higher up," is a form of vicarious liability. The employer is
held liable for the tortious acts of his employee so long as they are done in the course of
his employment. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS §§ 69-70, at 499-508 (5th ed.
1984).
38. Greene, 147 Il1. App. 3d at 1014-15, 498 N.E.2d at 870-72.
39. Id.

40. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1015, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
1016, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
1016, 498 N.E.2d at 871-72.
1016, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
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do so. 46 In the absence of precedent, the Greene court declined to
recognize apparent agency 47 as a theory of recovery in tort.48
Despite the court's pronouncement in Greene, two months
before the Greene decision, an Illinois court had recognized apparent agency as a theory for liability in a medical malpractice case.49
In Sztorc v. Northwest Hospital,50 the Appellate Court for the First
District held that a hospital may be liable under a theory of apparent agency for the negligent conduct of a physician. 5' The facts in
Sztorc were nearly identical to those in Greene.52 The relationship
clearly would not have survived an actual agency test.
The Sztorc court, however, continued its inquiry by analyzing
cases which addressed the issue of liability in the hospital/physician setting. The court cited Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital51 for the proposition that even without an actual agency relationship between the hospital and the physician, a
hospital may be liable for the acts of the physician.5 4 The court
then noted Holton v. Resurrection Hospital,55 in which the Appellate Court for the First District held that, when determining the
sufficiency of a complaint, a presumption of agency springs from
56
the fact that treatment occurs on the defendant's premises.
The court in Sztorc noted that the rationale for both the Darling
46. Id.
47. Id. Cases recognizing the apparent-agency tort theory include Hardy v. Brantley,
471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985); Williams v. St. Clair Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky.
App. 1983); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980);
Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
48. Green, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 1016, 498 N.E.2d at 872.
49. Sztorc v. Northwest Hosp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 275, 496 N.E.2d 1200 (1st Dist.
1986). The Sztorc opinion was filed August 4, 1986; the Greene opinion was filed October
2, 1986.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 279, 496 N.E.2d at 1202.
52. Id. at 277, 496 N.E.2d at 1201. The physician belonged to an independent radiology group. Id. The hospital did not control the physician's actions nor did it pay the
physician for individual services rendered. Therefore, the plaintiff could not allege the
requisite control and direct payment to state a cause of action hased on actual agency.
53. Id. at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1201 (citing Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966)).
54. Id. The court in Sztorc noted that several jurisdictions have adopted the apparent
agency doctrine. See, e.g., Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App.
2d 141, 128 P.2d 705 (1942); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 61, 426 N.E.2d
1187 (1980); Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. App. 1983); Themins v.
Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 55 Or. App. 901, 637 P.2d 155 (1981); Adamski v. Tacoma General Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
55. Sztorc, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1202 (citing Holton v. Resurrection
Hospital, 88 Ill. App. 3d 655, 410 N.E.2d 969 (1st Dist. 1980)).
56. Holton, 88 Il1.App. 3d at 659, 410 N.E.2d at 973.

Loyola Uriversity Law Journal

[Vol. 19

and Holton decisions was firmly rooted in realty: patients do not

normally know that the physicians who treat them are independent
contractors.5 7 Because patients cannot be expected to know the

contents of a private contract between the physician and the hospital, they should not be bound by the contract's terms. 58 A person
reasonably could believe that radiology services performed within
the hospital premises were provided by the hospital.5 9 Thus, the

court held that the plaintiff could recover on an apparent agency
theory, provided she could establish actual reliance on the representation.' Clearly, the Sztorc court's decision states the minority
view. In an area for which courts have long struggled to find an
equitable remedy, however, the decision may provide an indication
of the direction in which Illinois courts are heading.
III.

NEGLIGENCE

A. Comparative Fault
During the Survey year the Illinois Supreme Court continued to
delineate the effects wrought by the state's adoption of comparative
negligence. The impact has proven to be quite extensive.
1. The Manifest-Weight-of-the-Evidence Standard of Review
In Junker v. Ziegler,61 the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether the standard for granting a new trial should be more stringent than the usual manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard when
jury-apportioned fault was at stake.62 The court held that the
adoption of comparative fault principles necessitated no such
change.63
In Junker, the plaintiff was standing in his blind" at a commer57. Szortc, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1202 (citing Mduba v. Benedictine
Hospital, 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 279, 496 N.E.2d at 1202.
60. Id. The court held that a factual question existed regarding the plaintiff's reliance even though she testified at a deposition that she did not know whether she would
have acted differently had she known that the radiologist were in private practice, Id.
278-79, 496 N.E.2d at 1202.
61. 113 I11.2d 332, 498 N.E.2d 1135 (1986).
62. Id. at 339-40, 498 N.E.2d at 1138. The usual standard in Illinois for deciding a
motion for a new trial is "whether the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of
the evidence." Id. at 339, 498 N.E.2d at 1138.
63. Id. at 339-40, 498 N.E.2d at 1138.
64. A hunting blind is a "concealing enclosure from which one may shoot game."
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1977).
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cial hunting club when another hunter accidentally shot him.65
The jury found the plaintiff's damages to be $112,000, but attributed sixty-five percent of the fault to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the
jury reduced his award to $39,000.66 The trial judge found the jury
verdict to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, and
granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.67 The appellate court
reversed, suggesting that the appropriate standard in a motion for
a new trial was whether the verdict fell within the "range of the
68
evidence."

On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant relied
upon the appellate court's pronounced standard. He contended

that a reviewing court should upset a jury's apportionment of fault
only when no credible evidence exists that would support the jury's
determination. 69 The defendant reasoned that the adoption of

comparative negligence principles mandated a more deferential attitude toward the jury's apportionment of negligence between the
parties than had been recognized in the past.70 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention. 71 The court

noted that it was within the spirit of the comparative negligence
doctrine to tolerate small inequities so long as the final end is "generally satisfactory.' 72 Thus, comparative negligence principles authorized deference to the jury's apportionment of negligence, but
the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review adequately
respected the jury's role."
65. Junker, 113 Ill. 2d at 336, 498 N.E.2d 1136-37.
66. Id. at 337, 498 N.E.2d at 1136.
67. Id.
68. Junker, 129 Ill. App. 3d 853, 856, 473 N.E.2d 555, 557 (3d Dist. 1985). The
appellate court stated:
The standard to be applied by a trial judge in granting a new trial on the
apportionment of damages should be no different than the standard applied in
granting a new trial as to total damages. The general rule governing when a
verdict may be overturned as to total damages is when the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relationship to the loss suffered.
In other words, the verdict must be within the range of the evidence.
Id. at 856, 473 N.E.2d at 557.
69. Junker, 113 Ill. 2d at 339, 498 N.E.2d at 1138.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 339-40, 498 N.E.2d at 1138 (quoting Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 18, 421
N.E.2d 886, 893 (1981)). The court in Alvis adopted this language from a law review
article written by E.A. Turk. Alvis, 85 Il1. 2d 1, 18, 421 N.E.2d 886, 893. See Turk,
Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 304, 341-51 (1950).
73. Junker, 113 Ill. 2d at 339-40, 498 N.E.2d at 1138.
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Impact on the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
the effect that the adoption of comparative negligence principles
had on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.74 In Dyback v. Weber,"
the court held that with the adoption of comparative fault, a plaintiff's negligence no longer acted as an automatic bar to recovery.
Plaintiffs need no longer plead and prove their freedom from contributory negligence in order to present .a prima facie case under
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 76 The other two elements of the doctrine remain in full force."
At trial, the question of whether the plaintiff must prove his freedom from negligence never arose. It was clear that the plaintiff in
no way caused the fire that destroyed his home. 7s The appellate
court, however, raised the issue and held that the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Alvis v. Ribar79 abrogated the need for the
plaintiff to prove his freedom from contributory negligence.8 0 The
court reasoned that because the plaintiff's negligence is no longer a
bar to recovery, there is no reason to require the plaintiff to show
his freedom from negligence before he can state a claim.
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued
that because a plaintiff relying upon the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
receives an inference of general, rather than specific negligence,
comparative fault principles should not apply to benefit the plaintiff."' The court rejected this argument. A res ipsa loquitur analysis, the court stated, focuses on whether it is more probable than
not that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's injury. 2
74.

Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill. 2d 232, 500 N.E.2d 8 (1986). For a definition of the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. The Illinois
Supreme Court adopted pure comparative negligence in 1981. Soon after this, a conflict
among the districts developed. The conflict centered around whether the comparative
negligence principles embodied in Alvis v. Ribar, 85 111. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886, necessitated the deletion of the third element of proof (freedom from contributory negligence)
from the traditional res ipsa loquitur formula. Id. at 238-39, 500 N.E.2d at 11. The
Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in Dyback v. Weber to settle this interdistrict dispute.
75. 114 Ill. 2d 232, 500 N.E.2d 8 (1986).
76. Id. at 241, 500 N.E.2d at 12.
77. Id. at 238, 500 N.E.2d at 11. These elements are: (1) proof that the occurrence
that caused the plaintiff's injury does not ordinarily happen without negligence; and
(2) proof that the agency or instrumentality involved was exclusively within the control
of the defendant. Id. at 238, 500 N.E.2d at 11.
78. Id. at 238, 500 N.E.2d at 9-10.

79.

85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886.

80.
81.

Dyback, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 437, 480 N.E.2d at 852.
Dyback, 114 Ill. 2d at 240, 500 N.E.2d at 11.

82.

Id.
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The analysis is unconcerned with whatever else may have contrib-

uted to the injury. 3
The court noted that comparative fault converts the plaintiff's
contributory negligence from a complete bar to recovery to a mere
factor in reducing damages. 84 Thus, the court concluded, it logically followed that the plaintiff should no longer be barred from

recovering simply because his negligence caused the injury to some
degree, provided that the defendant was responsible as well.

5

The Dyback decision is enlightening in a pure comparative fault
context. Subsequent to Dyback, however, the Illinois legislature
adopted a modified version of comparative fault.8 6 Thus, the impact which Dyback will have upon future law is uncertain. The
statute, unofficially labeled "the greater fault bar approach,"8 7 provides that a plaintiff whose negligence accounts for more than fifty
percent of the cause of his injuries may not recover at all. 88 Logic,
as well as dicta in Dyback, suggests the future direction of the law.
As the court stated, "[t]he jurisdictions that operate under a modified comparative fault doctrine, of course, bar recovery on negligence claims, and also now under res ipsa loquitur claims, where

the plaintiff is found more than 50% negligent."'8 9
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur

The Illinois Supreme Court further discussed the res ipsa loqui83. Id.
84. Id. at 240-41, 500 N.E.2d at 12.
85. Id. at 239, 500 N.E.2d at 11. The court reviewed the decisions of other comparative fault jurisdictions, relying most heavily upon a New Mexico decision because that
state, like Illinois, had adopted the pure form of comparative negligence. Id. (citing
Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1980); Tipton v. Texaco, Inc.,
103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985); Cyr v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 145 Vt. 231,
485 A.2d 1265 (1984); Turk v. H.C. Prange Co., 18 Wisc. 2d 547, 119 N.W.2d 365
(1963)). The court deemed its decision to extend comparative fault principles to res ipsa
loquitur cases consistent with its reasoning in Casey v. Baseden, 111 111. 2d 341, 490
N.E.2d 4 (1986), which held that the plaintiff in a conventional comparative negligence
case need not demonstrate his complete freedom from negligence in order to recover. For
a discussion of Casey, see T. Smith & S. Lane, Torts, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy.
U. Ca. L.J. 795, 796-97 (1986).
The final disposition of the case, however, was a reversal. The court rejected the appellate court's finding that the plaintiff had shown the second element of proof: that the fire
which destroyed his home was not within the class of occurrences that ordinarily do not
happen without negligence. Dyback, 114 Ill. 2d at 242-45, 500 N.E.2d at 12-13.
86. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1986).
87. See, M. Pope & J. Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 839, 840-43
(1986).
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1986).
89. Dyback, 114 II!. 2d at 239, 500 N.E.2d at 11.
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tur doctrine in Imig v. Beck. 90 Clearing up some common misconceptions about the doctrine, the court held that a plaintiff's success
in presenting a prima facie case in res ipsa loquitur created a rebuttable, general inference of the defendant's negligence, which a jury
was free to accept or to reject. 91

Imig involved a head-on collision between a van and an automobile being towed by a wrecker.92 The investigating police officer
testified that it appeared from the location of the debris that the
accident occurred in the plaintiffs' lane, but none of the plaintiffs'
witnesses could testify to having seen the towed vehicle enter the
van's lane of traffic. 93 The plaintiffs offered the fact of the collision
as evidence of the defendant's negligence. 94 The defendants
presented proof of due care on their part. 95 The jury found for the

defendants.96 The appellate court held that the jury's verdict was
unsupported by the evidence and reversed.97 The appellate court

specifically noted that the defendants had failed to produce any
direct evidence that they did not cause the collision. 98
The Illinois Supreme Court soundly rejected the appellate

court's reasoning. The court noted that the principle of res ipsa
loquitur began as a rule of evidence. 99 Since its inception, however,
the principle has been intermingled with burden of proof issues, °°

and now has become a substantive principle as well as a procedural
rule of evidence. 0 1 In Imig, the Illinois Supreme Court cautioned

lower courts not to take this substantive aspect of res ipsa loquitur
too far. Res ipsa loquitur, the court stated, is simply a substitute

for circumstantial evidence. 102 Use of the doctrine permits the jury
90. 115 Ill. 2d 18, 503 N.E.2d 324 (1986). In listing the elements that the plaintiff
must show in order to raise a factual inference of negligence, the court omitted the third
element (that of demonstrating plaintiff's own freedom from negligence) in accord with
Dyback, 114 I11.2d 232, 238-42, 500 N.E.2d 8, 11-12. 115 Ill. 2d at 26, 503 N.E.2d at
328. See also infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
91. Imig, 115 Ill. 2d at 30-32, 503 N.E.2d at 328-30.
92. Id. at 21-24, 503 N.E.2d at 326-27.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id at 23-24, 503 N.E.2d at 327.
96. Id. at 24, 503 N.E.2d at 327.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 25, 503 N.E.2d at 328. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep.
299 (Ex. 1863); 3 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 48.01 (1977); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, TORTS § 39, at 243 (5th ed. 1984).
100. Imig, 115 11. 2d at 25-26, 503 N.E.2d at 328.
101. Id
102. Id at 26, 503 N.E.2d at 328-29.
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to draw an inference of negligence. 103 The inference of negligence
it raises may be strong or weak. 1°4 In response, a defendant will
usually present evidence to rebut the inference of general negligence.10 5 But the plaintiff in a res ipsa loquiturcase never loses the
burden of proof.1°
Applying these principles to the facts in Imig, the court stated
that the defendant had no duty to present direct, exculpatory evidence as the appellate court had suggested. 07 Further, the jury
could have rendered a verdict for the defendants even if the defendants presented no evidence at all. 10 8 The court held that the plaintiffs' use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created a "permissible
inference or deduction" of the defendant's negligence. 109 The jury,
however, was free to accept or to reject this inference." 0
Over the years, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has come to be
viewed as a device that eliminated the need for actual proof. The
Imig court warns that the doctrine is not the panacea in Illinois
that some believed it to be. After Imig, presenting a case based
upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will provide the plaintiff no
assurance of success, even if the defendant musters no defense. Accordingly, heavy reliance upon the doctrine after Imig would be illadvised.
C. A Court-CreatedInference of Negligence:
The Wrong-Lane Rule
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a
case involving the wrong-lane rule.III In Osborne v. O'Brien,1 2 the
court held that the defendant successfully rebutted an inference of
his negligence created from the fact that his automobile crossed
103. Md at 28-29, 503 N.E.2d at 330.
104. Iad at 27, 503 N.E.2d at 329.
105. Id at 27-28, 503 N.E.2d at 329.
106. Id. In the extraordinary res ipsa loquitur case, a directed verdict for the plaintiff
may be proper. Id
107. Id at 30-32, 503 N.E.2d at 329-30.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 30-32, 503 N.E.2d at 328-31.
110. Id.
111. The Illinois Supreme Court established the wrong-lane rule in Calvetti v. Seipp,
37 Ill. 2d 596, 227 N.E.2d 758 (1967), and Sughero v. Jewel Tea Co., 37 Ill. 2d 240, 226
N.E.2d 38 (1967). According to the wrong-lane rule, if a defendant's automobile is found
to have partially entered the oncoming lane of traffic at the time of a collision, an inference of specific negligence arises. Osborne v. O'Brien, 114 Ill. 2d 35, 39, 499 N.E.2d 455,
457-58 (1986). This inference is so strong that it shifts to the defendant the burden of
proving his freedom from negligence. Id.
112. 114 I1. 2d 35, 499 N.E.2d 455 (1986).
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over the center line into the oncoming lane of traffic, by presenting
evidence of due care and showing that he could not have anticipated the icy road conditions. Although the holding was fact dependent, the Osborne decision helps to delineate the components
necessary for a defendant to rebut the wrong-lane rule's inference
of negligence.
In Osborne, the defendant was driving down a steeply inclined,
curving road with no outlets when weather conditions caused the
road to become slick. The rear of the defendant's automobile began to slide to the left. The defendant tried to avoid the skid by
pumping the brakes and turning the steering wheel, but his efforts
were of no avail. The defendant's car crossed the center line and
11 3
collided with the plaintiff's oncoming automobile.
The facts in Osborne were very similar to those in Calvetti v.
Seipp.1 14 In Calvetti, the Illinois Supreme Court outlined what the
defendant must show to rebut the inference of her negligence created by her position on the road. The court stated that the defendant must explain that she could not have anticipated the danger;
that she was driving at a speed reasonable in view of the road conditions; and that her reaction to the road conditions could not have
been expected to send her into the wrong lane.'1 5 The court in
Calvetti held that because the defendant failed to offer a reason
other than ice on the pavement to explain why she skidded, judg16
ment for the plaintiff notwithstanding the verdict was proper.'
In Osborne, the defendant introduced evidence that he had no
reason to know in advance that the road was slippery; that by the
time he discovered the slick conditions he had no alternate route;
and that he tried to avoid the skid. The defendant also introduced
evidence that other vehicles driving down the hill were skidding,
though not necessarily into the other lane. 1 7 As in Calvetti, the
only reason the defendant gave for his skidding was the icy conditions. Unlike the court in Calvetti, however, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that the evidence the defendant presented was suffi113. Id. at 37-38, 499 N.E.2d at 456.
114. 37 Ill. 2d 596, 27 N.E.2d 758. In Calvetti, the road was slick and visibility was
poor. It had rained and had sleeted earlier, and was snowing at the time of the collision.
The defendant was driving down a slightly inclined road at a speed of twenty-five miles
per hour when her automobile went into a skid. She then turned the steering wheel of her
car to the right, sending the car's rear end into the other lane. The plaintiff's oncoming
automobile, also traveling twenty-five miles per hour, collided with the defendant's car.
Id. at 597, 227 N.E.2d at 759.
115. Id. at 598-99, 227 N.E.2d at 760.
116. Id. at 598, 227 N.E.2d at 760.
117. Osborne, 114 Ill. 2d at 37-39, 42, 499 N.E.2d at 456, 458.
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cient to warrant the jury's verdict for the defendant."1
Osborne can be interpreted as simply following the parameters of
proof set forth in Calvetti. The decision, however, may also represent a loosening of the requirements necessary for rebutting the
wrong-lane rule. Either way, as a result of Osborne, the wronglane defendant is probably less vulnerable to a directed verdict
than he was previously. If Osborne changes nothing else, it certainly makes clear that a defense is available which creates a question of fact for the jury to decide.
D. Duty
In Alop v. Edgewood Valley Community Association, 9 the Appellate Court for the First District considered whether the owner
of a playground had a duty to take precautions for the safety of
children playing there.' 20 The plaintiff in Alop sustained injuries as
12
a result of falling from a sliding board onto an asphalt surface. '
The court held that because the risk of falling was obvious to the
six-year-old plaintiff, the condition was not dangerous.1 22 Accordingly, the court concluded that the owner had no duty to protect
2 3
the child from the condition.
In Alop. the defendants entered into evidence the six-year-old
plaintiff's deposition.1 24 In that deposition, the plaintiff testified
that because asphalt was harder than sand or grass, she knew she
could get hurt by falling on it.125 From this statement and the fact
that the plaintiff was six years old, the court concluded that the
plaintiff knew or should have known that if she fell from the slide,
she risked being injured. 26 The court determined that the slideand-asphalt-surface combination constituted an ordinary condition
that a child old enough to play alone could appreciate and fully
118.
119.

Id at 42, 499 N.E.2d at 458.
154 Ill. App. 3d 482, 507 N.E.2d 19 (1st Dist. 1987).

120. Id. at 484, 507 N.E.2d at 21. The general rule in Illinois is that landowners owe
no special duty to children. See Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614, 625, 126
N.E.2d 836, 841 (1955). An exception to the rule occurs when the owner knows or has
reason to know that young children frequent the area and a dangerous condition of the
land causes the child's injuries. See Cope v. Doe, 102 Il1. 2d 278, 464 N.E.2d 1023

(1984); Corcoran v. Village of Libertyville, 73 Il1.2d 316, 383 N.E.2d 177 (1978).
121.

Alop, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 483, 507 N.E.2d at 20.

122. Id at 485-86, 507 N.E.2d at 21.
123. Id. at 485-88, 507 N.E.2d at 21-23. See also Chimerofsky v. School Dist. No.
63, 121 Ill. App. 2d 371, 257 N.E.2d 480 (1970) (no duty on landowner to guard against
the risk that a three-and-a-half-year-old child would be injured by falling from a slide).
124. Alop, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 486, 507 N.E.2d at 22.

125. Id
126. Id.
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understand. 2 7 Therefore, the landowner had no duty and hence
no liability toward the plaintiff.'
The Alop case typifies the recent
trend in the Illinois courts to limit a landowner's responsibility. In
this line of cases, as in Alop, courts have rejected the existence of a
landowner's duty and placed the burden of responsibility instead
upon the shoulders of a young child.
E.

Proximate Cause

The Survey year witnessed the continuation of an interdistrict
dispute on a proximate cause issue. The First District continued to
hold that a plaintiff may satisfy her burden of proving proximate
cause by showing that the defendant's action or inaction increased

the risk of harm to the plaintiff.129 On the same issue, the Third
District held that a plaintiff may prove proximate cause only by
showing there is a greater than fifty percent likelihood1that
defend30
ant's action or inaction caused the plaintiff's injuries.
1. The Increased Risk Approach
In Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.Luke's Medical Center,1 3
the plaintiff's decedent die after the defendant-physician's negligence rendered him comatose. 3 2 The coma resulted in brain damage and prevented the detection and treatment of a developing

cancer.1 33 134
The presence of cancer was not detected until the decedent died.
The testimony of expert witnesses differed concerning the cause
of the plaintiff's death. 35 When viewed in the light most favorable
127. Id.
128. Id. at 488, 507 N.E.2d at 23.
129. Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center, 155 Ill. App. 3d 458,
508 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp.,
143 Ill. App. 3d 479, 492 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1986); See also T. Smith & S. Lane, Torts,
1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 795, 806-8 (1986).
130. Russell v. Subbiah, 149 Ill. App. 3d 268, 500 N.E.2d 138 (3d Dist. 1986). In
Russell, the Third District followed the view taken previously by the Fourth District in
Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1985). The Curry
court rejected plaintiff's contention that the defendant's negligence could be established
by showing that the defendant decreased the plaintiff's decedent's chance of survival even
though his chances for survival absent the defendant's acts were estimated at less than
fifty percent. 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1985).
131. 155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1987).
132. Id. at 460-61, 508 N.E.2d at 427-28. The defendant's negligence was not an
issue in this appeal. Id. at 460, 508 N.E.2d at 427.
133. Id. at 461, 508 N.E.2d at 428.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 461-62, 508 N.E.2d at 428-29.
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to the plaintiff, however, the evidence suggested that absent the
defendant's negligence, the decedent would have had a thirty-three
percent chance of surviving. 36 The trial court submitted
the ques37
plaintiff.
the
for
found
jury
the
and
jury,
the
to
tion
On appeal, the defendant contended that because the decedent's
chance of survival was thirty-three percent, it was more probable
than not that he would have died regardless of the defendant's negligence.' 38 The defendant argued that his negligence could not, as
a matter of law, have constituted the proximate cause of the decedent's death. 3 9
The court noted that the defendant's contention would counter a
lost-chance-of-survivorship argument, but, the, plaintiff had not
taken this stance.'40 Therefore, the court rejected the defendant's
argument. The court adopted the position that once the plaintiff
shows his risk of harm was increased by the defendant's negligence, the question of whether the increased risk was a substantial
factor in producing the harm was for the trier of fact.'41 The court
42
concluded that the causal connection in Chambers was clear.
The court found that the defendant's negligence caused the coma
and increased the risk of harm to the decedent because the coma
prevented the underlying cancer from being diagnosed and
treated. 43 Specifically, the court held that "the negligently induced coma was a substantial factor in causing decedent's
136. Id.
137. Id. at 461, 508 N.E.2d at 427.
138. Id. at 462, 508 N.E.2d at 429. The court gave thorough and careful consideration to the defendant's argument, which mirrored the stance taken by the third and
fourth districts. Id.
139. Id. See also Russell, 149 Ill.
App. 3d 268, 500 N.E.2d 138; Curry, 136 Ill.
App.
3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711; Wise v. St. Mary's Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 587, 381 N.E.2d 809
(5th Dist. 1978).
140. Chambers, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 463, 508 N.E.2d at 429.
141. Id at 464, 508 N.E.2d at 430. The court here adopted section 323 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. This section provides that:
One who undertakes.., to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person... is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care in performing his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such
care increases the risk of such harm...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323, at 135-39 (1965). See also Northern Trust
Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp., 143 Ill.
App. 3d 479, 493 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist.
1986) (court adopted same proposition); Hamil v. Bashline III, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d
1280 (1978) (first medical malpractice case to adopt § 323). But see Curry v. Summer,
136 11. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1985) (court rejected § 323 as inapplicable to medical malpractice cases).
142. Chambers, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 508 N.E.2d at 430.
143. Id.
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death."'" Thus, by implication the court recognized that a cause
need not be fifty-one percent responsible for the injury to be a proximate cause.' 45 Rather, the cause need only constitute
a substantial
1 46
factor in causing the injury to be proximate.
2.

The Preponderant Cause Approach

In Russell v. Subbiah, 47 the court refused to adopt the increased
risk approach. Instead, the Appellate Court for the Third District
held that proximate cause could not be established absent a showing that the defendant's negligence was more than fifty percent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. 4 s The court reasoned that this
followed from the preponderance
of the evidence standard of proof
49
necessary in a civil case.
In Russell, the plaintiff, a two-year-old child, suffered from what
was ultimately found to be a spinal cord tumor. 50 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, in originally misdiagnosing his condition and thereby delaying proper treatment, caused increased injury to the plaintiff and prolonged the recovery period.15 ' An
expert's affidavit stated that the tumor itself was the most direct
and immediate cause of the damage. 5 2 The affidavit further related that the defendant's improper delay in diagnosing the tumor
was a "concurrent and a proximate cause."' 5 3 Had the defendant
diagnosed the tumor earlier, the expert concluded, the plaintiff
would have had a "fair
chance (50/50)" of a significantly shorter
14
period of recovery.
144.

Id.

145. Id. at 464-65, 508 N.E.2d at 430-31. The court noted that the language of the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act, under which the plaintiff brought the suit, provides that "an
action shall lie '(w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by ...neglect' which
would 'if
death had not ensued, have entitled the injured party to maintain an action and
recover damages.'" Id. at 465, 508 N.E.2d at 430 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para.
1 (1985)). Thus, the court reasoned that because the Wrongful Death Act does not re-

quire a person bringing suit to have had a better than fifty percent chance of survival,
there was no basis for imposing such a limitation upon the plaintiff in Chambers. Id.
146. Id. at 465, 508 N.E.2d at 430-31. The court noted that "[w]hether a person
would have had a thirty-three percent or sixty-six percent or one hundred percent chance
to survive but for the negligence of another is a question of fact properly determined by a
jury." Id. at 465, 508 N.E.2d at 431.
147. 149 Il.App. 3d 268, 500 N.E.2d 138 (3d Dist. 1986).
148. Id. at 272, 500 N.E.2d at 141.

149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 269, 500 N.E.2d at 139.
Id.
Id. at 271, 500 N.E.2d at 141.
Id.
Id.
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The court reasoned that the fifty/fifty odds fell short of showing
proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence.' 5 Thus, the
court held that because the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant's negligence was greater than fifty percent of the cause of
his injuries, the action failed.' 56 The court thereby established that,
in the Third District, a plaintiff must offer evidence that the defendant's negligence was the preponderant cause of the alleged injuries. Evidence of increased risk will not suffice.
As evidenced by these two divergent opinions, proximate cause
continues to be an area of significant controversy in Illinois. This
sharp division among the districts will be resolved only when the
Illinois Supreme Court decides the issue.
IV.

LOSS-OF-SOCIETY DAMAGES

During the Survey year, conflicting opinions surfaced regarding
who is entitled to receive loss-of-society damages. 5 7 The courts
continued their general trend toward expanding the availability of
loss-of-society damages in wrongful death actions. When faced
with the same issues in actions premised on serious injuries, however, the courts split. The First District was willing to extend the
reasoning used in the wrongful death cases to those involving serious personal injury, while the Fifth District preferred to leave any
expanding in this area to the legislature.
A.

The Availability of Loss-of-Society Damagesfor Death

In Ballweg v. City of Springfield,58 the Illinois Supreme Court
considered whether parents are entitled to a presumption of loss155. Id. at 272, 500 N.E.2d at 141.
156. Id.
157. The Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 1, 2 (1985),
allows recovery for "pecuniary injuries." The trend in Illinois has been "to expand the

scope of pecuniary injury to encompass non-monetary losses." Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Il1.
2d 505, 514, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1332 (1984). Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court now recognizes intangibles, such as "deprivation of the companionship, guidance, advice, love and
affection of the deceased" as fitting within the definition of pecuniary injuries. Hall v.
Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 31, 147 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1958). The focus in recent years has been

upon which relationships involve such intangibles so that the death of one of the parties
presumptively entails a loss of companionship or a loss of society.
158. 114 Il. 2d 107, 499 N.E.2d 1373 (1986). For a discussion of the evidentiary
issues involved in Ballweg, see the Evidence article in this Survey. The relevant facts in
Baliweg are as follows: Donna Ballweg was sailing a catamaran through a channel when
its main mast connected with an overhead power line. The contact electrified the boat as
well as the surrounding water, and Donna was killed when she jumped into the lake. Id.
at 112, 499 N.E.2d at 1375. Donna's parents brought an action premised on strict liability. Id. at 111, 499 N.E.2d at 1374.
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of-society damages for the death of a child over the age of eighteen.' 59 The court noted the lack of authority for applying this presumption to an adult child rather than a minor." Nevertheless,
the court held this presumption of loss valid in Illinois.' 6 1 The
court reasoned that the death of a child who was over the age of
eighteen was no less of a loss to parents than the death of a minor
child.' 62 Because the Illinois Supreme Court previously had held
that parents were entitled to a presumption of loss of society when
their minor child died,' 63 the presumption of loss of society should
64
be equally available for the parents of an adult child who died.'
In Sheahan v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad
Corp.,165 the Appellate Court for the First District made headway
similar to that made in Ballweg in the area of loss-of-society damages allowed in wrongful death actions. The Sheahan court held
that the brothers and sisters of the decedent in a wrongful death
166
action could properly claim loss-of-companionship damages.
The court reasoned that because the language of the Wrongful
Death Act which allowed the "next of kin" to recover for pecuniary loss had been interpreted to include "lineal kindred,"' 167 there
was no reason 68to exclude claims "presented by next of kin collater'
ally related."'
159. Id. at 118, 499 N.E.2d at 1378. This issue was explicitly left unanswered in
Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (1984), which held the
presumption valid for the parents of a minor child. Id.
160. Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 118, 499 N.E.2d at 1378.
161. Id. at 120, 499 N.E.2d at 1379.
162. Id The court stated:
[W]e refuse to draw a line based solely on the age of the child. We fail to see
how a presumption of loss of society suddenly disappears upon a child's eighteenth birthday. The return on parents' investment in their children is very real,
even though it may not be in the form of money. When children are wrongfully
killed, the parents' investment of money and affection, guidance, security and
love is destroyed. Society recognizes the destruction of that value, whether the
child is a minor or an adult.
Id.
163. Id. (citing Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984)).
164. Id.
165. 146 II. App. 3d 116, 496 N.E.2d 1179 (1st Dist. 1986).
166. Id. at 120, 496 N.E.2d at 1182. Unlike the court in Ballweg, however, the Sheahan court did not hold that the relationship under consideration merited a presumption
of loss of society. The court simply stated that a decedent's brothers and sisters should be
allowed an opportunity to plead and prove their pecuniary damages. Id.
167. Id. (citing Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984)).
168. Id.
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B.

The Availability of Loss-of-Society Damages
for Serious Injuries

In Dralle v. Ruder,169 the Appellate Court for the First District
held that loss-of-society damages were proper in a negligence or
strict liability claim.170 In Dralle, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-physician prescribed Bendictin, a drug manufactured by
the defendant pharmaceutical company, for her during her pregnancy. 17' The plaintiff further alleged that the use of this drug during pregnancy caused her son to be born with deformities and
brain damage. 7 2 The plaintiff brought an action against her physician for negligence and against the drug manufacturer under a
strict liability theory. 7 3 In both actions she sought to recover
damages for the diminution of society which her
child could pro74
vide to her because of his deformed condition.
The court agreed with the plaintiff that loss-of-society damages
should be available to parents of a child who suffered severe but
nonfatal injuries, M The court's reasoning paralleled the justification for loss-of-society damages to parents in wrongful death cases.
The court noted that the primary value of children to their parents
was not support, but rather the "intangible benefits they provide in
the form of comfort, counsel and society."' 7 6 Therefore, a cause of
action for loss of society should be available177
to the parents whether
the child was fatally or nonfatally injured.
The Fifth District, with its decision in Hearn v. Beelman Truck
Co. ,178 stands in opposition to Dralle. The Hearn court declined to
extend diminution of society damages to a minor child for the serious injuries received by her mother.' 79 The court recognized the
parallel between a loss-of-society claim when injuries are involved
and the same claim in a wrongful death action. The court stated,
however, without much discussion, that the decision whether to
169. 148111. App. 3d 961, 500 N.E.2d 514 (1st Dist. 1986), petition for leave to appeal
granted, - Ill. App. 3d -, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1987).
170. 148 IM.App. 3d at 963, 500 N.E.2d at 516.
171. Id. at 961-62, 500 N.E.2d at 515.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 962-63, 500 N.E.2d at 516.
176. Id. at 963, 500 N.E.2d at 516 (quoting Bullard v. Barnes, 102 II. 2d 505, 516-17,
467 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (1984)).
177. Id. (citing Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (Ist Dist.
1984)).
178. 154 Ill.
App. 3d 1022, 507 N.E.2d 1295 (5th Dist. 1987).
179. Id. at 1023, 507 N.E.2d at 1296.
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extend loss-of-society damages to serious injuries should be made
by the legislature, not by the courts. 8 0

V.

THE CONTRIBUTION ACT

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court developed
guidelines for deciding what constitutes a "good faith" settlement
or release under the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (the
"Contribution Act" or the "Act").'"" The court also ruled that a
contribution claim is separate and distinct from the original action,
and the basis for liability in the contribution action need not mirror
that of the original suit.
A. Good Faith Settlement
Consistent with the public policy favoring settlement, the court
in Ballweg v. City of Springfield 82 held that a settlement agreement
entered after the statute of limitations has run is valid as a good
faith settlement. 183 In Ballweg, two women sailing in an all metal
catamaran were killed when they dove into the water, which had
184
become electrified from the boat's contact with a power line.
Their companion, Phillip Henrici, remained on the boat and
survived. 185
The women's representatives, as plaintiffs, filed complaints on a
strict liability theory against the boat's manufacturer, the manufac180. Id. at 1023, 1025, 507 N.E.2d at 1296, 1297. The Hearn court did not cite
Dralle.
181. The Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70,
para. 301-05 (1985), provides in pertinent part:
(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given
in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury
or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors
from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it
reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
(d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is
discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(c), (d) (1985).
182. 114 Ill. 2d 107, 499 N.E.2d 1373 (1986).
183. Id. at 122-23, 499 N.E.2d at 1380. The settlement issue arose in the second of
the two cases consolidated into Ballweg, Ogg v. City of Springfield, 121 Ill. App. 3d 25,
458 N.E.2d 1331 (4th Dist. 1984). The case arose out of the same event that led to the
first suit, but involved the electrocution death of Jana Welch. See supra notes 173-79 and
accompanying text.
184. Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 112, 499 N.E.2d at 1375.
185. Id.
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turer's parent company, and the City of Springfield. 8 6 Two defendants 87 brought a counterclaim seeking contribution from
Henrici, the boat's pilot. 88 Prior to the trial, the plaintiff settled
with Henrici. 89 At the time of the settlement, the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff's potential suit against Henrici had
run.19° The trial court satisfied that the settlement had been made
in good faith, approved the settlement, and dismissed Henrici from
the suit.1 91 The appellate court reversed, noting that the statute
would have barred the plaintiff from bringing an action against
Henrici. Thus, the court held the settlement invalid for lack of
consideration. 92
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling
and affirmed the trial court. 93 The cout reasoned that because
the statute of limitations is a defense, it would operate only as a
potential bar to the plaintiff's action against Henrici.' 94 Henrici
had not yet raised the statute of limitations, thus he was still potentially liable to the plaintiff. The court concluded that this potential
liability constituted consideration for the settlement. 95 Therefore,
the settlement was made in good faith, and the court upheld the
settlement.
In Bryant v. Perry, 96 the Appellate Court for the Second District
Court of Appeals followed Ballweg, and found a settlement between a mother and daughter valid as a good faith settlement
under the Contribution Act. 97 In Bryant, the plaintiff, a minor,
was a passenger in an automobile driven by her mother, which collided with a truck. 98 The plaintiff, through her mother as next
friend, sued the truck driver, and the truck driver filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff's mother, seeking contribution. 99
186. Id. at 111, 499 N.E.2d at 1374.
187. Id. The defendants who brought the counterclaim under the Contribution Act
were the manufacturer of the boat and its parent corporation. Id.
188. Id. at 121, 499 N.E.2d at 1379.
189. Id.

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 121-22, 499 N.E.2d at 1379.
193. Id. at 122-23, 499 N.E.2d at 1380.
194. Id. at 122, 499 N.E.2d at 1380.

195. Id. The court noted that when deciding whether a settlement had been made in
good faith, a court must consider the circumstances surrounding the settlement. Id. at
122-23, 499 N.E.2d at 1380. In Ballweg, the trial judge was involved in the settlement

process from start to finish, and he was satisfied that this was a good faith settlement. Id.
196. 154 I1. App. 3d 790, 504 N.E.2d 1245 (2d Dist. 1986).
197. Id. at 798, 504 N.E.2d at 1251.
198. Id. at 791, 504 N.E.2d at 1246.

199. Id.
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Before trial, the trial judge approved a settlement between the
mother, as counterdefendant, and the daughter. 200 The issue on
appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding the settlement
to have been made in good faith under the Contribution Act.20
The appellate court first determined that the parental immunity
doctrine did not necessarily bar a claim by the daughter against her
mother.2 °2 The court likened the role of the doctrine of parental
immunity in Bryant to that of the statute of limitations in
Ballweg.2 °3 Until the defendant raised the doctrine of parental immunity in court and the court decided that the doctrine applied, a
suit by the plaintiff against her mother would be actionable. Thus,
the mother's potential liability to her daughter ensured that the
settlement was based on consideration, and was not a gratuity.2 °4
The court then considered a myriad of arguments offered by the
defendant in an attempt to prove the settlement was not made in
good faith, as required by the Act. 20 5 Among them was the contention that the mother's dual role as plaintiff for her daughter and
third-party defendant, the two parties to the settlement, evinced
collusion. 20 6 The court rejected this contention and noted that the
money was paid by the mother's insurer, not directly by the
mother. Therefore, it would be "mere speculation" to assume that
the mother was motivated by self-interest rather than her daughter's best interest.2 7 The defendant contended also that because
the plaintiff's lawyer initially estimated the worth of the case at
$150,000, but agreed to settle for $20,000, far below the $100,000
200. Id. The settlement amount of $20,000 was approved although the case had been
valued initially at $150,000 and the limit on the mother's insurance policy was $100,000.
Id. at 796, 504 N.E.2d at 1249. The mother was represented by one law firm in her role
as plaintiff and by another in her role as counterdefendant. Id.
201. Id. at 791-92, 504 N,E.2d at 1246.
202. Id. at 792-95, 504 N.E.2d at 124748. The court did not dispute the continued
existence in Illinois of the doctrine of parental immunity, but noted that the doctrine is
court created, and, therefore, may be modified when it does not serve its intended purpose. Id. (citing Larsen v. Bushkamp, 105 Il. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (2d Dist.
1982)). See Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Schenk v. Schenk,
100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (4th Dist. 1968). See also 19 J. MAR. L. REv. 807
(1986).
203. Bryant, 154 I1. App. 3d at 794-95, 504 N.E.2d at 1248. The court analogized
the case to Ballweg as follows: Just as the statute worked only as a potential bar in
Ballweg, no court had determined that a suit by the daughter against the mother would
be barred. Therefore, the mother was potentially liable to the daughter for her injuries.

Id.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 795-98, 504 N.E.2d at 1248-51.
Id. at 795-96, 504 N.E.2d at 1248-49.
Id. at 796, 504 N.E.2d at 1249.
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maximum of the mother's insurance policy, the settlement was not
made in good faith. 20 8 The defendant argued that it was the close
relationship between the parties, and not the belief that the settlement amount was reasonable, that motivated the settlement. The
court, however, attributed the plaintiff's attorney's change in attitude to the "practical aspect of the art of negotiation . . merely
reflective of9the realistic versus the optimistic view of the value of
'2
the case.
The defendants then contended that the settlement was not
made in good faith because it failed to reflect the proportionate
amount of fault the jury attributed to the mother in causing the
plaintiff's injury. 210 The court, however, noted that this test of
good faith relied on hindsight and was, therefore, unfair. 21 ' The
court recognized that parties execute settlement agreements before
trial and without a jury verdict to indicate the relative fault of each
tortfeasor. 1 2 These settlements, therefore, cannot be scrutinized
by reference to a jury-determined guilt ratio.21 3 The court stated
that the only fair test was one which determined whether the settlement was made in good faith by using only information known to
the parties at the time they settled. The court stated that such a
test could ask whether the sum paid was disproportionate to the
amount that the trial court reasonably could have thought the
plaintiff would recover.2t 4
The court cited Ballweg for the proposition that in deciding
whether the trial court erred in finding a good faith settlement, an
21 5
appellate court must take all the circumstances into account.
Although the relationship of the parties evokes suspicion, the trial
court made a specific finding that there was no evidence of collusion or wrongful conduct. Therefore, all the circumstances to208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 797, 504 N.E.2d at 1250. This argument followed from some California
decisions which determined the good or bad faith of a settlement by looking to the price
and comparing the ratio of the settlement to the final damage award. See River Garden
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972). Accord,
LeMaster v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 110 Ill. App. 3d 729, 442 N.E.2d 1367 (5th Dist.
1982).
211. Bryant, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 797, 504 N.E.2d at 1250 (citing Lowe v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co., 124 Ill.
App. 3d 80, 463 N.E.2d 792 (5th Dist. 1984)).

212. Id (citing Wasmsund v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 135 Il1.App. 3d 926, 482
N.E.2d 351 (1st Dist. 1985)).
213. Id.
214.

Id.

215. Id. at 798, 504 N.E.2d at 1250-51.
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gether clearly evinced a good faith settlement.216
Finally, the court noted that the good faith finding was "in keeping with the purpose and spirit of the Contribution Act"-to encourage settlement.21 7 As the trial court's finding of good faith was
consistent with the policy favoring settlement, and because each
circumstance cited by the defendant a indicative of collusion
could also support a finding of good faith, the appellate court held
that the settlement between the mother as counterdefendant and
the mother as next friend of her daughter was valid as a good faith
settlement under the Contribution Act. From this case, it seems
quite clear that Illinois appellate courts will favor settlements
Lnder the Contribution Act and find them to have been made in
"good faith" unless striking evidence to the contrary is presented.
B.

Covenant Not to Sue

In Stewart v. Village of Summit,218 the Illinois Supreme Court
considered whether a plaintiff who executed a covenant not to sue
the employee who caused his injury also lost his rights against the
employer under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior.2 ' 9 The covenant not to sue expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to sue any
other tortfeasor for the injury, but failed to specifically name the
employer as one the these tortfeasors.220
The court discussed the contentions of the parties regarding
whether the Contribution Act should apply in a respondeatsuperior situation, but did not resolve the issue.22' Instead, the court
decided the case by looking to precedent 222 and the intent of the
parties.223 The court reasoned that its earlier decisions indicated
216.

Id. at 798, 504 N.E.2d at 1251.

217. Id.
218. 114 Il. 2d 23, 499 N.E.2d 450 (1986).
219. Id. at 24-26, 499 N.E.2d at 451. See also supra note 37.
220. Id. at 25, 499 N.E.2d at 451. The covenant provided that the "undersigned
[plaintiff] hereby expressly reserves the right to sue any other person or persons against

whom he may have or assert any claim on account of damages arising out of the above
described accident." Id.
221. Id. at 26-28, 499 N.E.2d at 451-52. The court noted the existing split of authorities: One line reasoned that because the liability of the employer merely is imputed and
passive, a covenant not to sue the employee should also cover the employer. The court

declined to follow this view. Id.
222. Id. See Edgar County Bank & Trust Cc,. v. Paris Hosp., Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 298, 312
N.E.2d 259 (1974) (the execution of a covenant not to sue an employee that specifically

reserved plaintiff's right to sue the employer successfully preserved this right); Holcomb
v. Flavin, 34 Ill. 2d 558, 216 N.E.2d 811 (1966) (the execution of a covenant not to sue an

employee that reserved rights to pursue plaintiff's claim against others extinguished the
plaintiff's claim against the employer).

223.

Stewart, 114 Il1.2d at 30, 499 N.E.2d at 453.
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that a reserved claim against an employer survives the covenant
not to sue even though the claim is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.224 The court noted, without discussion, that this result was consistent with the intent of the parties. 225 Thus, the court
held that a plaintiff who executed a covenant not to sue the employee who caused his injury did not thereby lose his right to sue
that employee's employer under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.226
The Stewart opinion emphasizes the recent philosophy that, as a
general matter, the intent of the parties will control when deciding
upon the applicability of a release or covenant not to sue. It appears from Stewart that unless a party has specifically been included within a release or a covenant and the document provides at
least some general reservation of claims against other tortfeasors,
the unnamed tortfeasors will be unable to invoke the release or
covenant as a defense.
C. Acceptable Grounds for Contribution Actions
In McCartin-McAuliffe Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. J.L Case
Co. 227 the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether negligence
may serve as a ground for contribution in a product liability action.22 8 The court held that it may.229
In the original action, the employee brought a product liability
action against the manufacturer of a machinery part that caused
his injury. 230 The manufacturer then brought an action against the
employer seeking contribution.2 3 ' The original action resulted in a
jury verdict against the manufacturer.232 At trial, the jury considered three separate grounds for contribution: the employer's negligence, misuse of the product, and assumption of the risk. The jury
found for the manufacturer in the contribution action.233
The appellate court reversed, reasoning that because the original
action was premised on strict liability, only misuse and assumption
224.

Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 118 Ill. 2d 447, 516 N.E.2d 260 (1987). The contribution claim was consolidated with the original product liability suit (Dukes v. J.1. Case Co.) on appeal. Id. at
450, 516 N.E.2d at 262.
228. Id. at 458-59, 516 N.E.2d at 265-66.
229. Id. at 464, 516 N.E.2d at 268.
230. Id. at 450, 516 N.E.2d at 261.

231. IM
232. IM
233. Id
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of the risk could serve to divert liability to the third-party defendant. 234 The court held that negligence was not a proper basis for
liability, just as it would not have been a proper basis for liability in
the original action. Accordingly, instructions that included negligence constituted reversible error.235 In reaching this conclusion,
the appellate court relied upon Illinois Supreme Court precedent,
which indicated that negligence could be a valid ground for contribution in a product liability action only if the alleged negligence
could be construed as product misuse or assumption of the risk.23 6
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that the appellate
court mistakenly relied upon cases decided prior to the adoption of
the Contribution Act.237 The coirt stated that the Contribution
Act now governs such an action, and the Act divides the total liability among the contributors according to each contributor's relative fault.2 38 The court noted that the Act ensures that each party's
obligation is based upon his individual liability in tort to the injured party. 239 Thus, there is no reason for requiring each
tortfeasor's liability to rest upon the same theory, 240 nor is it necessary for the basis for recovery in contribution to "mirror the theory
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 458-60, 516 N.E.2d at 265.
Id. at 458-59, 516 N.E.2d at 265-66.
Id. at 459-60, 516 N.E.2d at 266. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Pack-

age Machinery Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1,374 N.E.2d 437 (1977); Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing
Co., 70 111. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977); Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70111.
2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1977).
237. McCartin-McAuliffe, At 459-61, 516 N.E.2d at 266-67.
238. Id at 461, 516 N.E.2d at 267. The relevant sections of the Contribution Act are
sections 2 and 3. Section 2 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are

subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or
the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even
though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them.

(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid
more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is
limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor
is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common
liability.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a), (b) (1985). Section 3 covers the amount of contribution. It states:

The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his
relative culpability. However, no person shall be required to contribute to one
seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share unless the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the
remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obli-

gation in accordance with their pro rata liability.
ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 70, para. 303 (1985).
239. McCartin-McAuliffe, 118 Il1. 2d at 462, 516 N.E.2d at 267.
240. Id. See Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill.
2d 1, 461 N.E.2d 382 (1984).
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of recovery asserted in the original action. ' ' 24 1 Consequently, the

court held that negligence is a proper ground for contribution
when the cause of action underlying the contribution action was
premised on products liability.242
VI.

RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court fortified its
standing as a leader in recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge.243 In two decisions, the court reasserted and expanded the
1984 ruling in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. 24 In Midgett, the
court considered whether a union employee could sue his employer
in tort for retaliatory discharge. 245 Reasoning that the availability
of a contract action did not bar the tort action, the court held that
union employees have the same right to bring an action in retaliatory discharge as do non-union employees. 2 "
In Gonzalez v. PrestressEngineering Corp.,247 the court decided
two issues. First, the court held that the state tort claim recog241. Id. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550
(1978); Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco, 81 NJ. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980).
242. McCartin-McAuliffe at 464, 516 N.E.2d at 268.
243. The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized the cause of action for retaliatory
discharge for employees whose employment had been terminated for filing Worker's
Compensation claims in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
The court reasoned that the goals of the Worker's Compensation Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, para. 131.1 (1981), would be defeated if an employer could threaten its employees
with termination for filing a claim. Then, in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85
Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981), the Illinois Supreme Court held that an employee
fired for reporting the criminal conduct of a co-worker had a cause of action in retaliatory
discharge. 85 Ill. 2d at 132-35, 421 N.E.2d at 879-80. Although the employees involved
in both Kelsay and Palmateerwere non-union, at-will employees, the court, faced with a
split between the appellate districts, soon confronted the issue of whether the tort should
apply to the union employees as well. See Midgett v. Sacket-Chicago, Inc., 105 11. 2d
143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
244. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cer. denied, 474 U.S. 909,
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
245. Id. at 147-48, 473 N.E.2d at 1282.
246. Id at 150-53, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-85. The contract involved was the collectivebargaining agreement which covered unionized employees. Id
247. 115 Ill. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986). Gonzalez contained the same consolidated
cases as Midgett. Gonzalez, 115 Ill. 2d at 4, 503 N.E.2d at 309. The Midgett court remanded the case. On remand, the defendant raised two defenses: (1) section 301 of the

Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1987), preempts plaintiffs' claims
(for a discussion of this issue, see the Labor Law article in this Survey); and (2) because
the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their union's grievance procedures, they were barred from
bringing a tort claim in retaliatory discharge. The plaintiffs moved to strike the defense,
and the trial court granted the motions, but requested an interlocutory appeal under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308, ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 110A, para. 308 (1985). The Illi-

nois Supreme Court granted the appeal. Id. at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 310.
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nized in Midgett remained intact despite a recent United States
Supreme Court decision pre-empting some state tort claims that
resemble claims for retaliatory discharge. 248 Second, the court considered whether to overrule that part of the Midgett decision which
held that union employees need not exhaust their contract remedies before becoming entitled to bring a tort action in retaliatory
discharge. 249 The court upheld the Midgett decision. The court
reasoned that the tort claim was wholly independent of a possible
contract claim and noted that the retaliatory discharge cause of
action was "firmly rooted in an important public policy. '2 0 Thus,
Gonzalez represents a powerful reaffirmation of the worker's right
to a remedy in tort when he is terminated unjustly regardless of
whether he contracted through a union to have such a wrong
remedied.
In Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District,251 the Illinois
Supreme Court explained that part of the Midgett decision that
addressed damages. The plaintiff in Boyles alleged she had been
terminated in retaliation for filing a claim under the Workers'
Compensation Act.252 Despite the fact she was a union member
and protected by a protective bargaining agreement, she brought
an action in retaliatory discharge directly against her employer
asking for both compensatory and punitive damages. 253 Her employer, however, was a "local public entity," immune from punitive damages under the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act.25 4 The issue before the court was
whether the tort of retaliatory discharge was available to a plaintiff
when punitive damages were unobtainable and when the plaintiff
could obtain compensatory damages through her union
248. Gonzalez, 115 111. 2d at 9, 12, 503 N.E.2d at 31 1, 313 (citing Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)). In Allis-Chalmers Corp., the court held that
§ 185(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1987), preempted
a state tort claim which resembled retaliatory discharge. Allis.Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S.
at 202.
249. Gonzalez, 115 Ill. 2d at 12, 503 N.E.2d at 313.
250. Id. at 12-14, 503 N.E.2d at 313-14.
251. 113 Ill. 2d 545, 499 N.E.2d 435 (1986).
252. Id. at 547, 499 N.E.2d at 435-36.
253. Id. at 547, 499 N.E.2d at 436. Retaliatory discharge claims typically involve
punitive damages. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that punitive damages should be allowed for such claims.
Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361. The court reasoned that punitive damages
were necessary because compensatory diunages alone were too minuscule to deter employers from engaging in like conduct ir the future. Id at 286-87, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
254. Boyles, 113 I11. 2d at 553-54, 499 N.E.2d at 438-39 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
85, paras. 1-101 through 10-101 (1985)).
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contract.255

The court first reiterated its holding in Midgett, stating that the
breach of contract action available to a union employee was entirely separate from the tort action of retaliatory discharge. 5 6
Therefore, the court concluded that the availability of compensatory damages through a contract claim did not preclude a plaintiff
from seeking similar damages in a tort action.257 Thus, the court
held that the plaintiff's complaint alleging retaliatory discharge
against her employer survived the motion to dismiss, even though
she could recover through the tort action only compensatory damages. 258 After Boyles, a plaintiff may bring an action for retaliatory
discharge and may receive compensatory damages259
when the employer-defendant is exempt from punitive damages.
VII. THE STRUCTURAL WORK ACT
In Vuletich v. United States Steel,26 the Illinois Supreme Court
considered whether temporary stairs constituted "supports" within
the meaning of the Structural Work Act (the "Act"). 261 The court
held that such stairs, if not used as a working platform to perform
a hazardous
activity, did not constitute "supports" under the
262
Act.

The plaintiff's employer in Vuletich contracted to complete certain tasks at the defendant's plant.263 The plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell while walking up temporary steps to a supply
trailer to return his tools. 264 The plaintiff stated that the stairs

were "wobbling," without handrails, and covered with snow and
255. Id. at 554, 499 N.E.2d at 439.
256. Id. at 554-55, 499 N.E.2d at 439.
257. Id. at 555, 499 N.E.2d at 439.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 555-56, 499 N.E.2d at 439.
260. 117 11. 2d 417, 512 N.E.2d 1223 (1987).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 60-69 (1985). The Act provides, in pertinent
part:
[A]II scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this state
for the use in erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house,
building, bridge, viaduct or other structure shall be so erected and constructed,
placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to life and limb
of any person or persons employed or engaged.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60 (1985).
262. Vuletich, 117 Ill. 2d at 425, 512 N.E.2d at 1226.
263. Id. at 420, 512 N.E.2d at 1224.
264. Id.
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ice when he fell. 2 65 At their highest point, the stairs were five feet
from the ground.266 The plaintiff argued that because the stairs
were used to elevate workers to a place where they could get tools,
they constituted supports within the meaning of the Act.26 7 Therefore, the plaintiff contended, an2 68injury that occurred on them
would be covered under the Act.
The court, however, rejected the plaintiff's contentions, proclaiming that the use of the purported support, not the nature of
the work performed on the support, determined whether it actually
fit within the Act's meaning of "supports. ' 269 The court reasoned
that the logical extension of the plaintiff's argument would require
all stairways, whether temporary or permanent, to be covered by
the Act. 270 Favoring a narrower interpretation of the Act, the
court concluded that stairs used only as a pathway and
not as a
2 71
working platform could not be considered "supports."1
The appellate court further defined "supports" for purposes of
the Act in Langley v. Simmons Contracting Company.2 The
plaintiff in Langley was a general superintendent charged with the
duty of inspecting work at the construction site. 7 He fell and was
injured when a board tipped as he walked across a sixteen-inch
high stack of scaffold boards in the defendant's assigned work
area. 274 The plaintiff sought recovery under the Act from, among
others, the defendant subcontractor. 2 7 The plaintiff maintained
that the Act covered his injury because he used the boards for support. 76 The court, however, reasoned that because it was not necessary for the plaintiff to cross the boards to get to the 27
work
site,
7
the stacked boards could not be considered "supports.1
The Appellate Court for the First District construed the Act
similarly in Harperv. Schal Associates. 8 In Harper,the court considered whether a claim for an injury sustained as a result of falling
into a depression in the ground not protected by planking was
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 422, 512 N.E.2d at 1225.
Id.
Id. at 422-23, 512 N.E.2d at 1225-26.
Id. at 422-23, 512 N.E.2d at 1225.
Id. at 423, 512 N.E.2d at 1225.
152 Ill. App. 3d 899, 504 N.E.2d 1328 (5th Dist. 1987).
Id. at 900-01, 504 N.E.2d at 1329.
Id. at 901, 504 N.E.2d at 1329.
Id.
Id. at 902, 504 N.E.2d at 1330.
Id. at 902-03, 504 N.E.2d at 1330-31.
159 Ill. App. 3d 542, 510 N.E.2d 1061 (1st Dist. 1987).
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properly within the Act. 279 The court held that such an injury was
not covered by the Act.280
In Harper, the plaintiff, an ironworker, was walking backward,
straightening out a cable when he tripped in a depression in the
ground and sustained injuries.28' The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a contractor, failed to provide proper and safe support as
was mandated by the Act. 282 The court used a three-pronged analysis to determine whether the plaintiff's injury was covered by the
Act. 2 3 According to the test, a court must determine three things
before it may declare a device included within the Act: (1) What
was the intended use of the device at the time of the injury?
(2) Did the injury have some connection with the hazardous nature
of the device? and (3) Was an element of danger involved in the
use of the device and, if so, did the legislature intend for the act to
284
alleviate this type of danger?
Applying this analysis to the facts in Harper, the court noted
first that the plaintiff merely was walking backward uncoiling a
cable, and not engaged in a hazardous activity when he was injured. 2" The area in which the plaintiff fell was not the plaintiff's
work area, but rather an access route for construction vehicles.286
Second, the absence of planking as supports over dry, packed earth
did not create a hazardous situation. 8 7 Finally, falling in a depression in the ground was not the type of activity from which the
General Assembly sought to protect the worker. 28 The depression
into which the plaintiff fell did not result from unusual construction plans, but was formed simply by normal construction activity. 289 The court concluded that, because the plaintiff's action
failed to satisfy any of the three prongs of the test, any planking
covering the depression should not be treated as supports under
the Act. 29° Thus, the plaintiff's claim against the defendant for his
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
Ashley

Id. at 544, 510 N.E.2d at 1063.
Id. at 547, 510 N.E.2d at 1065.
Id. at 544, 510 N.E.2d at 1063.
Id. at 546, 510 N.E.2d at 1064.
Id. at 547-49, 510 N.E.2d at 1065-66. The three-pronged test had its origin in
v. Osman & Associates, Inc., 114 Ill. App. 3d 293, 448 N.E.2d 1011 (1st Dist.

1983) and was adopted subsequently by the court in Rambert v. Advance Construction
Co., 134 Il. App. 3d 155, 479 N.E.2d 1007 (1st Dist. 1985).
284. Harper, 159 Il. App. 3d at 547, 510 N.E.2d at 1065.
285. Id. at 547-48, 510 N.E.2d at 1065.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 548, 510 N.E.2d at 1065-66.
288. Id. at 548, 510 N.E.2d at 1066.

289. Id.
290. Id.
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failure to cover the rut was nonactionable under the Act. 291
In Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Company,2 92 the Appellate Court for the Fifth District considered whether a plaintiff
injured from falling into tire tracks left by a cranelike device could
maintain a claim under the Act.293 The court held that because the
injury was unrelated to the hazardous nature of the device, the
plaintiff had no claim.294 The mere fact that the ruts were formed
by a device covered by the Act was
not a sufficient reason to equate
295
the tracks with the device itself.
The thread common to all these decisions seems to be a more
stringent interpretation of the Structural Work Act. Prior to the
past few years, Illinois courts had followed the direction of the legislature of 1907, which passed the Act, and interpreted it liberally.
In recent years, however, this trend has reversed, and courts instead sometimes strain to deny coverage to the injured worker
under the Structural Work Act.

VIII.

DEFAMATION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court decided two
libel cases. In Owen v. Carr,296 the court ruled that the controver298
sial "innocent-construction rule" 297 is still in full force in Illinois.
The court acknowledged, however, that the rule itself had been
tempered with the requirement that the proposed innocent con291. Id. at 548-49, 510 N.E.2d at 1066.
292. 145 Ill. App. 3d 915, 495 N.E.2d 1348 (5th Dist. 1986).
293. Id. at 917, 495 N.E.2d at 1349.
294. Id. at 918-19, 495 N.E.2d at 1350.
295. Id. at 919, 495 N.E.2d at 1350.
296. 113 Il1.2d 273, 497 N.E.2d 1145 (1986).
297. The innocent-construction rule mandates that if an allegedly defamatory statement can be interpreted as either defamatory or innocent, the innocent construction must
prevail. The original source of the rule was obiter dictum in John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill.
2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962), which stated:
[The innocent-construction] rule holds that the article is to be read as a whole
and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words
allegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and
declared nonactionable as a matter of law.
24 I1. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108. The adoption and subsequent vigorous application of the innocent-construction rule made it very difficult for a plaintiff to get past the
pretrial motions. Consequently, the rule has received much criticism. See, e.g., ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION,

§ 24, at 161 (1978); Polelle, The Guilt of the 'Inno-

cent Construction Rule' in Illinois Defamation Law I N.I.U.L. REV. 181 (1981);
Stonecipher & Trager, The Impact of Gertz on the Law of Libel in Illinois, 1979 S.I.U.L.J.
73; Symposium, Libel and Slander in Illinois, 43 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1 (1966). Cf Comment, The Illinois Doctrine of Innocent Construction: A Minority of One, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 524 (1963).
298. Owen, 113 Il.2d at 278, 497 N.E.2d at 1147.
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struction must be reasonable.299 In the second case, Wanless v.
Rothballer,3 ° the court considered what standard of appellate review was appropriate when a libel case involved First Amendment
issues. The court concluded that de novo review was the appropriate standard in such cases.3a '
Owen arose out of another libel suit. 30 2 The defendant, an attorney, filed a libel action against the plaintiff, also an attorney, on
behalf of his client, a judge.30 3 The defendant's libel action focused
on a complaint the plaintiff made to the Judicial Inquiry Board

(the "Board") concerning the conduct of the judge. 304 A reporter

for a legal publication interviewed the defendant and published the
defendant's statement in an article about the lawsuit. 30 5 Among
the statements the article attributed to the defendant was language
to the effect that the plaintiff, by complaining to the Board, was
trying to intimidate the judge so that future cases would result in
favorable treatment of his client. 30 6 The article also compared this
case to a libel case that the defendant previously won in which he
used this same "improper purpose" theory of liability.30 7
The plaintiff then filed a libel suit against the defendant for mak299. Id. at 279, 497 N.E.2d at 1148. The requirement that the innocent construction
also must be a reasonable interpretation came with the court's decision in Chapski v.
Copley Press, 92 I1. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982). In Chapski, the Illinois Supreme
Court lamented that the trend in applying the innocent-construction rule had been to
"strain to find unnatural but possibly innocent meanings of words where such a construction is clearly unreasonable and a defamatory meaning is far more probable." 92 Ill. 2d
344, 350-51, 442 N.E.2d 195, 198. This strained application of the innocent-construction
rule led to inconsistent and contradictory holdings. Therefore, the Chapski court made it
clear that only those innocent constructions that were reasonable should be considered by
a court when applying the innocent-construction rule.
We therefore hold that a written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and
obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be
actionable per se. This preliminary determination is properly a question of law
to be resolved by the court in the first instance; whether the publication was in
fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff is a question for the
jury should the initial deternination be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.
92 11. 2d 344, 352, 442 N.E.2d 195, 199.
300. 115 Ill. 2d 158, 503 N.E.2d 316 (1987).
301. Id. at 169-70, 503 N.E.2d at 321.
302. Owen, 113 Ill. 2d at 276, 497 N.E.2d at 1146.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. The whole article is reprinted in the appendix to the case. Id. at 283-86, 497
N.E.2d at 1149-52.
306. Id. at 276, 497 N.E.2d at 1146.
307. Id. The previous libel case resulted in the largest libel damages ever awarded in
the United States.
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ing these statements. 30 8 The plaintiff claimed that these statements
constituted libel per se because they impugned his professional integrity and prejudiced him in the practice of law. 30 9 The court rejected this contention. 310 The court considered that the statements
reasonably could be innocently construed, as the article merely
communicated Carr's theory of the case, rather than stating as a
fact that it was the actual purpose of the plaintiff to intimidate the
judge. 31 1 Further, when the article was read as a whole, the statements did not constitute libel per se.312 Therefore, the court held
that the innocent-construction rule applied to the facts
of Owen to
313
defeat the plaintiff's cause of action for libel per se.
The court in Wanless determined the appropriate standard of
appellate review in a libel case involving First Amendment issues. 314 In Wanless, the plaintiff was the village attorney, a public
figure. 315 After trial of the Wanless case, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.31 6 The appellate court conducted a de novo
review, found that the plaintiff had failed to prove actual malice as
was constitutionally required, and reversed.31 7 The Illinois
Supreme Court noted its responsibility to follow the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court concerning what is constitutionally
required.31 8 One of these requirements, the court stated, was that a
state supreme court conduct an independent appellate
review on
31 9
the issue of proof of actual malice in a libel suit.
After discussing the Supreme Court precedent, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that faithful application of the federal
constitution could be assured only through a de novo review.32°
Thus, the court interpreted the "independent review" mandated by
the United States Supreme Court to mean de novo review.
Both Owens and Wanless reflect the judicial policy disfavoring
308. Id. at 275, 497 N.E.2d at 1146. The plaintiff also named as defendants the publisher of the National Law Journal, the publication that printed the allegedly defamatory
article, as well as the reporter who wrote the article. Id.
309. Id. at 277, 497 N.E.2d at 1147.
310. Id. at 279-81, 497 N.E.2d at 1148.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 279-80, 497 N.E.2d at 1148.
313. Id. at 282, 497 N.E.2d at 1149,
314. Wanless, 115 Ill. 2d at 167-70, 503 N.E.2d at 320-21. This question will arise
when the plaintiff is a public figure and the case survives a motion to dismiss.
315. Id. at 162, 503 N.E.2d at 317.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 167-68, 503 N.E.2d at 320.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 169, 503 N.E.2d at 320-21.
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defamation actions in Illinois. When the federal constitutional requirements such as the necessity of proving actual malice or recklessness and de novo appellate review are combined with Illinois'
innocent-construction rule, a state of the law results that makes a
cause of action nearly impossible to maintain successfully. There is
no indication that this policy will soon abate. 2'
IX.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, both the Illinois Supreme Court and the
appellate courts addressed a number of significant issues. Perhaps
most noteworthy was the Supreme Court's decision to deny damages to a plaintiff asserting the controversial wrongful life cause of
action. The appellate courts, as well, decided a variety of cases
containing significant and controversial issues. In some instances,
the districts' opinions sharply conflicted, indicating areas in which
a final decision by the Illinois Supreme Court would be welcomed.

321. But see Berkos v. National Broadcasting Company, 161 I11.App. 3d 476, 515
N.E.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1987), petition for leave to appealgranted, slip. op. #85-2552, Nov.
5, 1987. A case decided just after the Survey year, but noteworthy nevertheless. In
Berkos, the appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Judge Christy S. Berkos'
complaint against the defendant, NBC, even though the plaintiff was a public figure. The
appellate court in Berkos used a somewhat new approach to the innocent-construction
rule, balancing the possible innocent interpretation against the defamatory interpretation
of the statement and choosing the less "strained" meaning. It remains to be seen whether
other courts will adopt this approach.

